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Introduction  
Banking regulation has historically focused on making a detailed assessment of risk at the 
level of individual banks’ balance sheets. But, in an interconnected system, banks that appear 
sufficiently healthy when viewed individually may collectively present a material threat to the 
solvency of the system as a whole. First, there may be similarities between banks’ asset 
exposures that generate a tendency for banks’ solvency positions to deteriorate and improve 
together. This can leave the system vulnerable to common shocks to the macroeconomy or to 
capital markets. Second, losses at an individual bank that are sufficient to cause it to default 
may trigger contagious failures of other banks in the system if they have extended it loans. 
Such contagious failures could, in turn, trigger further rounds – or cascades – of contagious 
defaults in the banking system. System-wide losses could then far exceed the size of the 
initial shock. 
Vulnerabilities of the system as a whole that cannot be identified by focusing narrowly on the 
health of individual banks suggest that a change in the way that risks to the banking system 
are assessed and prudential requirements for banks are calibrated could be beneficial. This 
paper describes a system-wide risk management approach to deriving capital requirements 
for banks that reflect the impact their failure would have on the wider banking system and the 
likelihood of contagious losses occurring.  
At the centre of the approach is the policymaker’s optimisation problem. The policymaker is 
assumed to be interested in ensuring that the probability of banking system insolvency over a 
given time horizon is less than a chosen target level. This reflects the policymaker’s systemic 
risk tolerance. The target could, of course, be achieved in all states of the world by setting 
very high systemic capital requirements. But the policymaker may also want to limit the 
potential inefficiency costs associated with regulatory capital requirements. In particular, if 
equity capital is more expensive than debt because of market frictions, higher capital 
requirements could, for example, increase the cost of bank lending to non-bank borrowers in 
the wider economy. The possible trade-off between financial stability and financial efficiency 
motivates a constrained optimisation problem, where a policymaker seeks to identify capital 
requirements for individual banks that keep to a minimum the total level of capital in the 
banking system overall, subject to meeting their chosen systemic risk target. The solution of 
the constrained optimisation problem is a unique level of capital in the banking system and 
its distribution across banks. 
In this paper, the constrained optimisation problem faced by the systemic policymaker is 
combined with a structural model of the banking system to determine risk-based systemic 
capital requirements for individual banks. The evolution of banks’ balance sheets and the 
manner in which interbank (or “network”) exposures between firms are cleared follow 
Elsinger et al (2006), in the spirit of Merton (1974). This captures two drivers of systemic risk: 
(i) the correlations between banks’ assets that may lead to multiple banks becoming 
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fundamentally insolvent simultaneously; and (ii) the potential for contagious failures to occur, 
as losses from fundamentally insolvent banks are transmitted and amplified in the wider 
system via defaults on interbank obligations. 
The paper assumes a very specific form of an objective function that a systemic policymaker 
could adopt, centred solely on resilience. A broader modelling framework and objective 
function might also include measures of cyclical imbalances in the economy including, for 
example, deviations of bank credit availability from a measure of equilibrium. These 
considerations are beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, the modelling choices in the 
paper reflect a trade-off between realism (complexity) and pragmatism (simplicity) in the 
description of credit risks facing an interconnected banking system. As such, the primary 
focus of the paper is to obtain general insights into the properties of risk-based systemic 
capital requirements, rather than to calibrate precise nominal amounts that may be required 
to achieve particular risk targets in practice. 
The paper is structured as follows. First we outline the details of the model and the 
policymaker’s optimisation problem. We then set out the calibration of the model and the 
iterative process used by the policymaker to determine banks’ systemic capital requirements 
– namely, the minimum configuration of capital across banks consistent with a particular 
measure and target for system-wide credit risk. Finally we present illustrative results for 
systemic capital requirements and comparative static exercises. 
Modelling systemic solvency risk 
This paper uses the Merton-style structural credit risk model described by Elsinger et al (2006) 
to quantify risks to the solvency of an interconnected banking system. The model can be 
thought of as a panel of correlated Merton (1974) balance sheet models, jointly estimated 
using observed bank equity returns, and combined with a network of interbank exposures that 
is cleared using the algorithm described by Eisenberg and Noe (2001). Figure 1 illustrates the 
broad setup of the model used to quantify systemic risk in this paper (inside the hatched 
border) and the type of comparative static exercises and numerical optimisations that can be 
performed using the model (blue). The asset value dynamics of the combined balance sheet 
model can be used to produce the distribution of asset shortfalls below promised debt liabilities 
for the system as a whole – which are hereafter called system losses. 
Figure 1 




(a) A, D and C refer to assets, debt and capital, respectively. 46  BIS Papers No 60
 
 
Each bank  n i i ,..., 2 , 1   holds assets outside of the banking system of 
0
i A  and is assumed to 
have a single issue of zero-coupon debt outstanding to non-banks with a face value of 
0
i D  
that falls due for repayment at time     i . In addition, each bank  n i i ,..., 2 , 1   may have an 
aggregate interbank asset against the other banks in the system of 
I
i A  and an aggregate 
interbank liability of 
I
i D . These inter-bank exposures are captured in an inter-bank matrix 
M . Like debt to non-banks, interbank debt is also assumed to have a maturity     i . Banks 
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Each bank’s assets  i A  evolve according to a geometric Brownian motion with ex ante fixed 
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Based on these correlated asset dynamics, the solvency positions of banks  n i i ,..., 2 , 1   are 
checked at date     i . There are two types of default in the model, labelled “fundamental” 
and “contagious”. If, after simulating forward the above diffusion process, the assets of any 
given bank, X, are below its (fixed) debt liabilities at time     X , bank X is declared 
fundamentally insolvent. In this case, its loss-given-default is endogenously given by the 
difference between the level of assets at the point at which solvency is assessed and the 
face value of its debt falling due. But losses for the system do not end here. The fundamental 
default of bank X triggers losses for other banks in the network that have extended it 
interbank loans. In some cases, clearing of the interbank network M may result in a second 
bank, Y, defaulting – even though it may be above the solvency threshold if it had not made 
this loss on its interbank exposure to bank X. This represents a contagious failure for bank Y. 
In this case, the assets of bank Y are marked down from the level reached under the 
diffusion process in equation (1) by an exogenously-chosen contagious bankruptcy cost of 
10% (based on James (1991)). The interbank positions of other banks in the network are 
then re-evaluated. This process is repeated until there are no further rounds of contagious 
default in the banking network. It presents a mechanism by which losses initially borne by 
one bank can be transmitted and amplified through an interconnected banking system. 
Denoting the value of each banks’ assets after network clearing by  i A
~
, total losses in the 
banking system at debt maturity     i  are thus given by: 
      
i
i i A D L ~   (2) 
Policymaker’s optimisation problem 
If capital is more expensive than debt, the efficiency of the banking system is a decreasing 
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various reasons, including because of principal agent problems between managers and 
shareholders (Jensen (1986); Jensen and Meckling (1976)) or because of information 
asymmetries between insiders and external investors (Myers and Majluf (1984)). A 
policymaker interested in mitigating systemic risk, however defined, while limiting inefficiency 
in the banking system might therefore seek to achieve a chosen systemic risk objective for 
the lowest compatible level of capital in aggregate. In this paper, the systemic risk objective 
is defined in terms of a target for the location of the z
th percentile of the distribution of system 
losses relative to promised debt liabilities. The constrained optimisation problem is: 
  0 . . min
} {
, , 2 , 1



















The constraint in equation (3),      0 ,..., 2 , 1   n i i
system
z C VaR , can also be expressed as 
    z D C A
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  1 Pr . In other words, the policymaker tries to keep inefficiency 
(total capital) to a minimum subject to the banking system remaining solvent with a chosen 
target probability (the probability of system assets being below system liabilities being equal 
to  z  1 ).
3 The parameter  z  reflects the trade-off between the systemic risk and efficiency 
objectives. For example, a high value of  z  might be suitable if there is a relatively shallow 
trade-off between systemic risk and economic efficiency, ie in the case that equity capital is 
not materially more expensive than debt.
4 
Solving the policymaker’s optimisation problem is complicated by the fact that the optimal 
level of capital in the banking system in aggregate and the optimal distribution of capital 
across banks are not separable. For example, consider a system of two banks. Each has the 
same fundamental uncertainty about asset value returns going forward, but bank X starts 
with a much larger cushion of capital than bank Y. In this case, an extra £1 of capital given to 
bank X has a smaller impact on its asset shortfall distribution than if it were given to bank Y. 
If, in addition, bank X (idiosyncratically safe) has a large interbank asset against bank Y 
(idiosyncratically risky), giving an extra £1 to bank Y materially reduces the contingent-
default risk of bank X – and, consequently, for the two-bank system in aggregate. Increasing 
the aggregate level of capital by £1 therefore has little impact on systemic risk unless it is 
given to bank Y. 
To solve the policymaker’s optimisation problem we use the following iterative procedure: 
1.  Determine the total level of system capital, holding fixed the relative shares of total 
capital for each bank, which achieves the chosen systemic risk constraint. This is 
done by taking each bank’s observed capital levels and increasing (decreasing) total 
system capital, 
i
i C , if      0 ,..., 2 , 1   n i i
system
z C VaR . 
2.  Adjust the share of total capital held by each bank,     n i i n i i C C ,..., 2 , 1 ,..., 2 , 1
~
   , such 
that      0
~
,..., 2 , 1   n i i
system
z C VaR . If this is possible, the allocation   n i i C ,..., 2 , 1
~
  must be 
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superior to  n i i C ,..., 2 , 1   because systemic risk is lowered for the same level of 






. The reallocation of capital across banks is done 
using simulated annealing to try to ensure that the global solution of the 
policymaker’s constrained optimisation problem is obtained (see Cerny (1985)). 
3.  Reduce the level of system capital by a small amount  , allocated pro-rata across 
banks, and perform the optimisation in step 2 again. 
4.  Repeat steps 2–3 until it is no longer possible to further reduce system capital and 
simultaneously achieve the policymaker’s chosen tolerable level of systemic risk. 
This yields the minimum level of aggregate capital that can be allocated across 
banks and simultaneously meet the chosen systemic risk constraint.  
Model calibration 
The model is calibrated using UK data for the period 2004 H1 to 2009 H1. Banks’ balance 
sheets are based on information from five major UK banks’ published accounts. “Debt” is 
interpreted as total liabilities excluding large exposures to the other four banks, minus 
shareholders’ funds excluding minority interests.
5 “Large exposures” are defined as those 
exposures that exceed 10% of eligible capital,
6 which UK banks must report to their 
supervisors. The interbank network is calibrated to these large exposures.
7 When banks fail 
because of losses on interbank exposures (contagious default) rather than in response to the 
value of their non-bank assets (fundamental default), this paper assumes that assets are 
marked down by 10% from the level reached endogenously through the diffusion process in 
equation (1). It is assumed that banks have a weighted-average debt liability of one year, at 
which point their solvency is assessed. Banks’ observed equity prices are used to estimate 
the contemporaneous expected return on banks’ assets and the variance-covariance 
structure between banks’ asset returns. 
Results 
Figure 2 shows the surcharges that would need to be added to banks’ capital ratios to solve 
the policymaker’s optimisation problem in the illustrative case z = 0.05. They differ across 
banks because losses incurred by the rest of the system differ according to which bank(s) 
fails and because the probabilities of such losses crystallising vary. By design of the 
policymaker’s optimisation problem, the corresponding distributions of system losses under 
the optimised configurations of bank capital shift to the level (see Figure 3 for the case for 
2009 H1). 
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Figure 2  Figure 3 
Systemic capital surcharges
























(a)  Change in the ratio of capital to assets for each 
bank in the network following the optimisation in 
equation (3). 
(a)    Accounting for asset correlation and explicit 
interbank exposures between firms, assuming 
contagious default carries a deadweight cost of 
10% of assets. 
(b)    Following the optimisation in equation  (3). 
Circles show location of 95th percentile. 
(c)    Loss expressed as a fraction of system-wide 
debt liabilities. 
Changing the characteristics of banks in ways that affect the impact of a bank failure on 
system losses changes the values of the capital surcharges. Figure 4 shows what happens if 
the size of one bank (bank 1) is increased. Systemic capital surcharges for bank 1 are higher 
than in the benchmark case to offset the larger impact its failure has on the rest of the 
system through the interbank network. This is actually sufficient, in a number of instances, to 
reduce systemic capital surcharges for the other banks in the network because there are 
fewer scenarios under which they experience interbank losses large enough to cause them 
to contagiously fail, which would otherwise further transmit and amplify losses. Figure 5 
shows the marginal impact on systemic capital surcharges of doubling direct balance sheet 
exposures between banks. These results illustrate a robust-yet-fragile property of financial 
networks: the system as a whole can in some circumstances be made substantially more 
robust for a relatively small increase in aggregate capital, notwithstanding differences in 
capital surcharges across banks. 
Conclusions 
The financial crisis has led to calls for banks’ capital requirements to be set, in part, to reflect 
the impact that their failure would have on the rest of the financial system. This paper has 
presented a potential system-wide risk management approach to informing the calibration of 
such systemic capital requirements. Using a calibrated model of a stylised banking system, 
the results in this paper illustrate that banks’ systemic capital requirements are increasing in 
balance sheet size and in the value of their interbank obligations, other things being equal. 50  BIS Papers No 60
 
 
Figure 4  Figure 5 
Systemic capital surcharges when  
one bank doubles in size
(a)(b) 
Systemic capital surcharges when 
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Solid shading shows marginal impact of 
doubling balance sheet of bank 1
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Solid shading shows marginal impact of 
doubling interbank large exposures
Dashed shading corresponds 
to benchmark case
(a)  Change in the ratio of capital to assets for each 
bank in the network following the optimisation in 
equation (3). 
(b)    Diamonds show total change in capital 
requirement. 
(a)  Change in the ratio of capital to assets for each 
bank in the network following the optimisation in 
equation (3). 
(b)    Diamonds show total change in capital 
requirement. 
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